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1. Introduction 
Inaction in microeconomic adjustment is pervasive. A stylized fact of the empirical dynamics of employment, invest-
ment and prices is that they exhibit periods of inaction punctured by bursts of adjustment. 1 A leading explanation of this
phenomenon is that ﬁrms face a ﬁxed cost of adjusting. In such an environment, ﬁrms will choose not to adjust for some
time, with periodic discrete adjustments in response to suﬃciently large shocks, consistent with the empirical “lumpiness”
of microeconomic dynamics. 
In this paper, we analyze the aggregate implications of this lumpiness at the microeconomic level. We do so in the
context of a canonical model of ﬁxed adjustment costs in the presence of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks that has been We are very grateful to Andrew Clausen, Igor Livshits, Ricardo Reis, and an anonymous referee for particularly detailed and helpful comments. We also 
thank Rudi Bachmann, Giuseppe Bertola, Russell Cooper, William Hawkins, Virgiliu Midrigan, David Ratner, Jonathan Thomas, and anonymous referees, as 
well as seminar participants at numerous institutions for their comments. All errors are our own. The views expressed here do not necessarily reﬂect the 
views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, the staff and members of the Federal Reserve Board, or the Federal Reserve System as a whole. 
 Elsby and Michaels gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the UK Economic and Social Research Council ( ESRC ), Award reference ES/L009633/1 . 
 Appendices associated with this paper can be found in the Supplementary Material posted online at [WEBSITE]. 
∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: mike.elsby@ed.ac.uk (M.W.L. Elsby). 
1 See Hamermesh (1989) on employment; Doms and Dunne (1998) on capital; Bertola et al. (2005) on durable goods; and Bils and Klenow (2004) on 
prices. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.07.008 
0304-3932/© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
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 used widely in prior literature. For concreteness, we focus on the case of employment adjustment, although we show how
the model can be applied equally to price and investment dynamics. 
We establish a novel neutrality result: Even in the absence of equilibrium adjustment of market prices, the dynamics of
aggregate outcomes implied by standard models are approximately neutral with respect to a plausibly small ﬁxed adjust-
ment cost. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 , we describe the basic ingredients of the model. Firms face shocks to labor
productivity that induce changes in their desired level of employment. Firms are subject to both aggregate and idiosyn-
cratic shocks. Aggregate shocks drive macroeconomic expansions and recessions; idiosyncratic shocks drive heterogeneity
in employment dynamics across ﬁrms. Due to the presence of a ﬁxed adjustment cost, however, ﬁrms’ employment will
not adjust in response to all shocks. Instead, employment evolves according to an Ss policy at the microeconomic level,
remaining constant for intervals of time with occasional jumps to a new level. 
Given this environment, Section 3 takes on the task of aggregating the lumpy microeconomic behavior identiﬁed in
Section 2 up to the macroeconomic level. These aggregate implications are not obvious. Since individual ﬁrms follow highly
nonlinear Ss labor demand policies, and face heterogeneous idiosyncratic productivities, there is no representative ﬁrm in-
terpretation of the model. 
We infer the dynamics of aggregate employment by solving for the dynamics of a related object, the cross-sectional
distribution of employment across ﬁrms. A simple mass-balance approach provides a transparent characterization of the
distribution dynamics of employment that holds for a comparatively wide class of processes for shocks and adjustment rules.
Perhaps more importantly, our characterization of aggregate dynamics admits a particularly clean economic interpretation. In
particular, we show that the evolution of the ﬁrm-size distribution can be related simply and intuitively to the probabilities
of adjusting to and from each employment level. By impeding these ﬂow probabilities, the adjustment friction distorts
the ﬁrm-size distribution. These dynamics of the distribution of employment across ﬁrms in turn shape the evolution of
aggregate employment, since the latter is simply the mean of that distribution. 
This characterization of the cross section greatly facilitates our subsequent analysis of the model’s dynamics. In Section 4 ,
we develop the main result of the paper—approximate aggregate neutrality. In particular, we use the general results of
Section 3 to inform analytical approximations to model outcomes in the presence of a small ﬁxed adjustment cost. This
is a compelling neighborhood to study because, as noted since Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Mankiw (1985) , even small
adjustment costs will induce substantial inaction in microeconomic adjustment. In this neighborhood, we show that the
dynamics of the ﬁrm-size distribution approximately coincide with their frictionless counterparts. It follows that the same
approximate neutrality extends to the behavior of aggregate employment in general. 
We show that this approximate neutrality result can be traced to a symmetry property that emerges in the distributional
dynamics of employment as the adjustment friction becomes small. The mass-balance approach of Section 3 makes the
intuition for this symmetry particularly transparent. Speciﬁcally, the change over time in the density of ﬁrms at a given
level of employment can be decomposed into an inﬂow of ﬁrms that adjusts to that level, less an outﬂow of ﬁrms that
adjust away from that level of employment. The key is that a ﬁxed adjustment cost reduces both of these ﬂows relative to
the frictionless case. Fewer ﬁrms adjust away from a given employment level. But, in addition, fewer ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to
adjust to that employment level. For small frictions, these two forces are symmetric, leaving the distribution of employment
approximately equal to its frictionless counterpart along its dynamic path. 
This neutrality result is reminiscent of Caplin and Spulber (1987) who obtain a similar outcome in a related pricing
problem. Although they consider a much simpler environment without idiosyncratic shocks and only one-sided adjustment,
our result retains a ﬂavor of theirs. Speciﬁcally, Caplin and Spulber demonstrate that a uniform cross-sectional distribution
will be invariant in their model due to a form of symmetry—ﬁrms induced to adjust from the bottom of the distribution
to the top exactly replace ﬁrms displaced from the top of the distribution. Thus, one interpretation of our neutrality result
is that it generalizes the Caplin and Spulber insight to an environment with idiosyncratic risk and two-sided adjustment.
By the same token, this helps to explain why Golosov and Lucas (2007) ﬁnd small aggregate effects in their quantitative
analysis of a related model with these ingredients. 
An interesting feature of our approximate aggregate invariance result is that it holds for any realization of the aggregate
state of the economy, which includes ﬁrms’ perceptions of the current and future path of the equilibrium wage. That is, it
does not rely on equilibrium adjustment of wages. 2 This contrasts with an inﬂuential recent literature that has emphasized
the role of market price adjustment in muting the aggregate effects of ﬁxed adjustment costs (see, for example, House, 2014;
Khan and Thomas, 2008; Veracierto, 2002 ). Rather, the near-symmetry in the dynamics of the distribution of ﬁrm size is a
property of aggregation , and holds for any conﬁguration of market prices. 
In Section 5 of the paper, we illustrate these analytical results in a series of quantitative illustrations. We ﬁrst param-
eterize the model using estimates from recent literature on employment adjustment and ﬁrm productivity ( Bloom, 2009;
Cooper et al., 2007; 2015; Foster et al., 2008 ). Numerical results reveal that this parameterization of the model implies ag-
gregate employment dynamics that are very close to their frictionless analogue even when market wages are ﬁxed, in line
with the approximate-neutrality result in Section 4 . 2 In the case of a price setting problem, the aggregate state incorporates ﬁrms’ anticipations of future aggregate prices. For any set of these anticipations, 
our neutrality result implies that the aggregate supply curve will approximately coincide with its frictionless counterpart. 
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 There remains a lack of consensus over some of the parameters of the model, however, so we also explore the sensitivity
of this baseline result. Alternative parameterizations that match the frequency and average size of employment adjustments
in U.S. microdata; vary the persistence of idiosyncratic shocks; and allow for different speciﬁcations in which adjustment
costs vary stochastically over time, or with ﬁrm size, all leave the approximate neutrality result in baseline case essentially
unimpaired. 
To generate deviations from frictionless dynamics, the model suggests that rates of adjustment must be signiﬁcantly
lower. Consistent with this, we ﬁnd that the dynamics of aggregate employment can exhibit some persistence relative to its
frictionless counterpart in the case where the adjustment cost is larger relative to the variance of innovations to idiosyncratic
productivity. This mirrors the emphasis of related research by Alvarez and Lippi (2014) and Alvarez et al. (2016) on the
importance of idiosyncratic dispersion to aggregate dynamics. We ﬁnd, though, that the effects of alternative, plausible
parameterizations are modest, yielding only small deviations from frictionless dynamics that vanish after a quarter or two. 3 
Taken together, these results suggest that the symmetry result uncovered in Section 4 is quite powerful, in the sense that it
is robust to a number of alternative parameterizations. 
In the closing sections of the paper, we show how our analytical framework can be used to elucidate cases in which
non -neutralities emerge. A few recent papers have considered a Poisson-like process for idiosyncratic productivity in which
ﬁrms draw a new value with some probability each period ( Gertler and Leahy, 2008; Midrigan, 2011 ). This induces an atom
in the conditional distribution of idiosyncratic productivity at its lagged value. We show that this discontinuity in turn
breaks neutrality in a precise way. Speciﬁcally, we show that the symmetry, and hence also the neutrality we emphasize in
the early sections of the paper, hold for all ﬁrms except those prevented from adjusting by the Poisson friction. It follows
that aggregate employment evolves approximately according to a pure partial-adjustment process with constant rate of
convergence equal to the Poisson parameter, mirroring partial adjustment dynamics. A quantitative illustration conﬁrms the
accuracy of this prediction. 
We conclude by highlighting promising avenues of future research in the light of our ﬁndings. One message is that the
role of the magnitude of adjustment frictions relative to idiosyncratic uncertainty in shaping implied aggregate dynamics
emphasizes the value of obtaining robust estimates of these parameters. Beyond this, though, the unifying theme of sym-
metry that underlies the results of this paper provides two further directions to pursue. First, more work that assesses
the presence of asymmetries in ﬁrms’ adjustment policies and their contribution to deviations from frictionless dynamics
would be worthwhile. Second, further empirical research into the distributional form of idiosyncratic shocks also will shed
an important light on the aggregate consequences of ﬁxed adjustment costs. 
2. The ﬁrm’s problem 
We consider a canonical model of ﬁxed employment adjustment costs. Later, we describe how our analysis can be applied
to related problems of capital and price adjustment. The microeconomic environment is as follows. Time is discrete. Firms
use labor, n , to produce output according to the production function, y = pxF (n ) , where p represents aggregate productivity,
and x represents shocks that are idiosyncratic to an individual ﬁrm. We assume the evolution of idiosyncratic shocks is
described by the distribution function G ( x ′ | x ), with associated density function g ( x ′ | x ). 4 
To facilitate the analytical approximations used later in the paper, we make the following assumptions: 
A1. F ( n ) is analytic, with F n ( n ) > 0 , and F nn ( n ) < 0 . 
A2 . G ( x ′ | x ) is analytic, and induces the stationary distribution G 
(
x ′ 
)
= ∫ G (x ′ | x )dG ( x ) . 
The latter assumption is consistent, for example, with conventional parameterizations of idiosyncratic shocks used in the
literature, which typically invokes lognormal shocks. 
At the beginning of a period, ﬁrms observe the realization of their idiosyncratic shocks x , as well as aggregate productiv-
ity p . Given this, they then make their employment decision. If the ﬁrm chooses to adjust the size of its workforce, it incurs
a ﬁxed adjustment cost, denoted C . 
For the purposes of the main text, we focus on the case in which there is no exogenous attrition of a ﬁrm’s workforce, so
that during periods of inaction employment remains unchanged. We do this to economize on notation and to convey ideas
transparently. The appendices in the Supplementary Material show that all the results we present continue to hold for the
case in which a constant fraction δ of the ﬁrm’s workforce separates each period. 
It follows that we can characterize the expected present discounted value of a ﬁrm’s proﬁts recursively as: 
( n −1 , x ;) ≡ max 
n 
{
pxF ( n ) − wn −C1  + βE 
[

(
n, x ′ ;′ 
)| x, ]}, (1) 
where 1  ≡ 1 [ n  = n −1 ] is an indicator that equals one if the ﬁrm adjusts and zero otherwise. The wage w is determined in a
competitive labor market, and is taken as exogenous from the ﬁrm’s perspective. The variable  summarizes the aggregate3 Appendix D in the Supplementary Material also reports results for the case with equilibrium price adjustment. This conﬁrms the message of King and 
Thomas (2006) and Khan and Thomas (2008) that, where non-neutralities exist for ﬁxed market prices, equilibrium price adjustment pushes the dynamics 
toward their frictionless path. 
4 We denote lagged values with a subscript, −1 , and forward values with a prime, ′ . 
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 state of the economy. The latter includes the wage w, the aggregate shock p , and all variables that are informative with
respect to their future evolution, including, for instance, the preceding periods’ ﬁrm size distributions. 
For the analysis that follows, it is helpful to recast the ﬁrm’s problem in Eq. (1) into two related underlying Bellman equa-
tions for the value of adjusting (gross of the adjustment cost), ( x ; ), and the value of not adjusting, 0 ( n −1 , x ;) , 
( x ;) ≡ max 
n 
{
pxF ( n ) − wn + βE 
[

(
n, x ′ ;′ 
)| x, ]}, and (2)
0 ( n −1 , x ;) ≡ pxF ( n −1 ) − wn −1 + βE 
[

(
n −1 , x ′ ;′ 
)| x, ]. (3)
Clearly, the value of the ﬁrm ( n −1 , x ;) is simply the upper envelope of these two regimes, 
( n −1 , x ;) = max 
{
( x ;) −C, 0 ( n −1 , x ;) 
}
. (4)
It is well-known that it is diﬃcult to characterize in general the optimal policy rule for this problem. 5 In keeping with
the literature on ﬁxed adjustment costs, we assume that the optimal labor demand policy takes an Ss form. The policy is
characterized by three thresholds for the idiosyncratic shock x , L ( n ; ) < X ( n ; ) < U ( n ; ), that determine when to adjust
and, if so, by how much. Fig. 1 illustrates such a policy from numerical simulations described later in the paper. 
Consider ﬁrst the question of how to reset employment, conditional on adjusting. Clausen and Strub’s (2016) general
envelope theorem implies that the ﬁrm’s problem is differentiable at an optimum, so that the reset policy rule X ( n ; )
satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition 
pX ( n ;) F n ( n ) − w + βE 
[
n 
(
n, x ′ , ′ 
)| x = X ( n ;) , ] ≡ 0 . (5)
Thus, X ( n ; ) summarizes labor demand, conditional on adjusting. 
Due to the adjustment cost, however, the ﬁrm will decide to adjust only if the value of adjusting, net of the adjustment
cost, ( x ;) −C, exceeds the value of not adjusting, 0 ( n −1 , x ;) . This aspect of the ﬁrm’s decision rule is characterized
by two adjustment thresholds, L ( n −1 ;) and U ( n −1 ;) . For suﬃciently bad realizations of the idiosyncratic shock, x <
L ( n −1 ;) , the ﬁrm will shed workers; for suﬃciently good shocks, x > U ( n −1 ;) , it will hire workers. For intermediate
values of x ∈ [ L ( n −1 ;) , U ( n −1 ;) ] , the ﬁrm will neither hire nor ﬁre, and n = n −1 . Thus, the adjustment thresholds trace
out the locus of points for which the ﬁrm is indifferent between adjusting and not adjusting. It follows that the thresholds
satisfy the value-matching conditions 
( L ( n −1 ;) ;) −C = 0 ( n −1 , L ( n −1 ;) ;) , and 
( U ( n −1 ;) ;) −C = 0 ( n −1 , U ( n −1 ;) ;) . (6)
The following assumption collects the properties of the optimal labor demand policy that we will use throughout: 
A3. Optimal labor demand takes a two-sided Ss form in which the thresholds L, X and U are increasing functions of n, and
the reset policy X is differentiable in n. 5 Exceptions are the continuous-time Brownian case ( Harrison et al., 1983 ), and the case of one-sided adjustment ( Roys, 2014; Scarf, 1959 ). 
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 There are important precedents for this assumption. For example, the inﬂuential work of Caballero and Engel (1999) also
assumes optimality of a two-sided Ss policy. With further assumptions on the scaling of the adjustment cost with produc-
tivity, and on the evolution of idiosyncratic shocks, they are able to show that any such policy will have the property that
L , X and U are increasing functions of n and analytic. 
Our own justiﬁcation for A3 mirrors that in Gertler and Leahy (2008) . As we shall do later in Section 4 , Gertler and Leahy
study the case of a (plausibly) small C . This implies that the optimal policy in a neighborhood of C = 0 is indeed Ss , with
the reset policy X and adjustment thresholds U and L increasing, smooth functions of n . 
Firms’ optimal policies clearly depend on the aggregate state . For example, positive shocks to p will cause the Ss
policy in Fig. 1 to shift downward: For any given x , a ﬁrm will be less likely to ﬁre, and more likely to hire in an aggregate
expansion. However, since many of the ensuing arguments hold for any given aggregate state , to avoid clutter we suppress
this notation except where necessary. 
3. Aggregation 
This section infers the aggregate implications of ﬁrms’ Ss labor demand policies. Aggregation in this context is non-
trivial: an individual ﬁrm’s labor demand depends in a highly nonlinear fashion on its individual lagged employment n −1 
and the idiosyncratic shock x . The presence of heterogeneity in these state variables implies there is no representative ﬁrm
interpretation of the model. 
To infer aggregate labor demand, we characterize a related object—the cross-sectional distribution of employment across
ﬁrms. We denote the density of this distribution by h ( n ), and its associated distribution function by H ( n ). The aggregation
result we develop in this section is an important ingredient to our subsequent analysis in Section 4 of the conditions under
which aggregate outcomes are approximately neutral to the adjustment friction, C . 
In Proposition 1 we derive the ﬂows in and out of the mass H ( n ). This in turn implies a law of motion for the density of
employment h ( n ) that has a particularly intuitive form that evokes an “inﬂow-less-outﬂow” interpretation. However, since
any point along the density function has measure zero, it should be noted that the same is true of these “ﬂows.”
This approach can be conveyed most transparently in the special case where x is i.i.d., with distribution function G ( x ).
To begin, we calculate the outﬂow from the density h ( n ). The share of ﬁrms that adjusts from n is 1 − G [ U ( n ) ] + G [ L ( n ) ] :
the probability that x lies below the lower trigger (which leads the ﬁrm to ﬁre) or above the upper trigger (which leads the
ﬁrm to hire). Therefore, if h −1 ( n ) represents the initial density of ﬁrms with employment n , the outﬂow is 
( 1 − G [ U ( n ) ] + G [ L ( n ) ] ) · h −1 ( n ) . (7) 
To infer the inﬂow to h ( n ), consider the set of ﬁrms that draw an idiosyncratic productivity of x = X(n ) . If the
adjustment cost were suspended momentarily, these ﬁrms would adjust to n , and the inﬂow into h ( n ) would equal
∂ G [ X ( n )]/ ∂ n ≡h ∗( n ). Note that h ∗( n ) is well-deﬁned by virtue of A2 and A3, which ensure that G and X are differentiable.
Following Caballero et al. (1995) , we refer to h ∗( n ) as the density of mandated employment. 6 In the presence of a ﬁxed
cost, however, Fig. 1 reveals that only ﬁrms whose initial employment, n −1 , is either relatively low ( n −1 < U −1 X ( n ) < n ) or
relatively high ( n −1 > L −1 X ( n ) > n ) will adjust to n . Thus, the inﬂow to h ( n ) is (
1 − H −1 
[
L −1 X ( n ) 
]
+ H −1 
[
U −1 X ( n ) 
])
· h ∗( n ) , (8) 
where H −1 ( ·) denotes the distribution function of inherited employment. The change over time in the density at n , h ( n ),
is then the difference between the inﬂows (8) and the outﬂows (7) . 
Proposition 1 generalizes this approach to the case in which idiosyncratic productivity x follows a ﬁrst-order Markov
process, with distribution function G ( x ′ | x ). 
Proposition 1 (Aggregation) . The density of employment across ﬁrms evolves according to the law of motion 
h ( n ) = 
(
1 −H 
[
L −1 X ( n ) | X ( n ) ]+ H [U −1 X ( n ) | X ( n ) ]) · h ∗( n ) − ( 1 − G [ U ( n ) | n ] + G [ L ( n ) | n ] ) · h −1 ( n ) , (9) 
where G ( ξ | ν) ≡ Pr [ x ≤ ξ | n −1 = ν] is the distribution function of idiosyncratic productivity conditional on start-of-period em- 
ployment; H ( ν| ξ ) ≡ Pr [ n −1 ≤ ν| x = ξ ] is the distribution function of start-of-period employment conditional on idiosyncratic 
productivity; and h ∗( n ) ≡ ∂ G[ X ( n )]/ ∂ n is the density of mandated employment. 
Proposition 1 closely resembles the results from the i.i.d. case, except that the probabilities of adjusting to and from n
are modiﬁed to account for persistence in x . Initial ﬁrm size conveys information about past productivity through last pe-
riod’s optimal employment policy. Since productivity is persistent, the probability of events x ≥U ( n ) or x ≤ L ( n ) must then be
calculated conditional on initial size, n . It follows that the probability of adjusting away from n is 1 − G [ U ( n ) | n ] + G [ L ( n ) | n ] ,
with G deﬁned as in Proposition 1 . The outﬂow from n now takes the form in (7) , but with G replaced by G. In the same6 At this point, the density of employment mandated by the reset policy X ( n ) in the event that the adjustment cost were suspended momentarily may 
differ from the frictionless density of employment that would result if the adjustment cost were suspended indeﬁnitely . The reason is that the reset policy 
can, in principle, depend on the presence of the adjustment cost. 
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 vein, the realization of x = X ( n ) conveys information about the distribution of lagged employment. Consequently, the prob-
ability of adjusting to n is evaluated according to the distribution, H, of lagged employment conditional on x = X ( n ) . This
yields 1 −H 
[
L −1 X ( n ) | X ( n ) ]+ H [U −1 X ( n ) | X ( n ) ]. The inﬂow to n takes the form in (8) but with H −1 replaced by H. 
To be able to compute the law of motion in Proposition 1 thus requires a characterization of the distribution G, which in
turn implies H by Bayes’ rule. This is provided in Lemma 3 in the Supplementary Material, which derives a law of motion
for G and establishes some of its properties. 
In summary, Proposition 1 provides a link from the microeconomic friction to the aggregate dynamics. The ﬁxed cost
slows the movement of ﬁrms away from their initial size n , since a share of them, G [ U ( n ) | n ] − G [ L ( n ) | n ] , does not ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to adjust. Likewise, only a fraction of ﬁrms that desire to adjust to n relocate there in the face of the ﬁxed cost. 
3.1. Aggregate labor demand 
With the aid of Proposition 1 , it is straightforward to construct aggregate labor demand. Based on the aggregate state ,
ﬁrms derive their optimal labor demand policy functions L ( n ; ) < X ( n ; ) < U ( n ; ). The aggregate implications of ﬁrm’s
choices are expressed through the density of employment h ( n ), computed as in Proposition 1 , for a given history h −1 ( n ) .
Aggregating over ﬁrms thus yields aggregate labor demand for a given aggregate state, 
N d ( ) = 
∫ 
nh ( n ;) d n. (10)
Proposition 1 delivers a key ingredient to labor market equilibrium. It is only one ingredient, however. Recall that the
aggregate state  includes aggregate productivity p , the market wage w, and all variables that are informative with respect
to their future evolution. Equilibrium requires two additional conditions that bear on , on which Proposition 1 is silent.
First, the market wage w adjusts, and is anticipated to adjust, to equate aggregate labor demand in (10) with aggregate
labor supply at all points in time. Second, and related, ﬁrms’ perceptions of the aggregate state  must be consistent with
equilibrium outcomes. In particular, since  includes any information that forecasts future wages, it follows from (10) that
ﬁrms’ perceptions of the current (and expectations of the future) ﬁrm-size distribution h ( n ) are part of the aggregate state.
In equilibrium, these perceptions must in turn coincide with the law of motion reported in Proposition 1 , evaluated at the
equilibrium wage. 
Nonetheless, we shall see in Section 4 that Proposition 1 sheds light on the aggregate equilibrium by uncovering proper-
ties of aggregate labor demand that hold for any . In particular, we establish that aggregate labor demand is approximately
invariant to small ﬁxed adjustment costs, in the sense that the aggregate labor demand schedule in Eq. (10) (approximately)
coincides with its frictionless counterpart, for any set of perceptions about the current (and future evolution) of the aggre-
gate state. It follows that the intersection of aggregate labor demand and supply will yield (approximately) the frictionless
equilibrium. 
3.2. Relation to the literature 
We are not the ﬁrst to consider the analytics of aggregating lumpy microeconomic behavior. For example, a number
of papers have considered the implications of one-sided Ss policies in which the variable under control—employment in
the above model—is adjusted only in one direction. As Cooper et al. (1999) and King and Thomas (2006) show, one-sided
adjustment yields much simpler cross-sectional dynamics: Employment (or capital) at each ﬁrm decays exogenously, and
is intermittently updated to a reset value. However, two-sided adjustment is a perennial feature of employment and price
adjustment—ﬁrms hire and ﬁre workers ( Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992 ); prices are adjusted both up and down ( Klenow and
Malin, 2011 ). Proposition 1 provides a means to analyze the aggregate effects of adjustment frictions in this empirically-
relevant case. We shall see that the presence of two-sided adjustment has important implications for the nature of aggregate
dynamics. 
In two-sided adjustment problems, progress on aggregation has been made within the class of continuous-time models
where idiosyncratic shocks follow a Brownian motion. Indeed, the derivation of the cross-sectional distribution in this con-
text, which applies the Kolomogorov forward equation, resembles the structure of Proposition 1 (see Bertola and Caballero,
1994; Dixit, 1993; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994 ). Most recently, Alvarez and Lippi (2014) study a price-setting problem with mul-
tiple products and show that the dynamics of the average price level—analogous to the mean of h ( n ) in our context—are
mediated by the frequency of adjusting, a result reminiscent of Proposition 1 above. Bertola and Caballero (1990) study ag-
gregate outcomes in a Brownian model in which there are both ﬁxed and kinked costs of adjusting (the latter are omitted in
our analysis). Proposition 1 is not restricted to the Brownian class; rather, our results obtain for a general ﬁrst-order Markov
process for idiosyncratic productivity. 
For our purposes, Proposition 1 is especially useful because it facilitates analysis of the aggregate dynamics in the next
section. The simple link between the dynamics of the cross section and the adjustment probabilities to and from points
in the distribution appears to be new to the literature, and provides a mapping from the microeconomic friction to the
aggregate dynamics with a clean economic interpretation. We show how to use this result to characterize the model’s
aggregate implications in a transparent way. 
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 4. Approximate aggregate neutrality 
The previous section provided a general characterization of the aggregate dynamics implied by a model of lumpy mi-
croeconomic adjustment. In this section, we derive analytical approximations to model outcomes that form the basis of the
key result of the paper, namely that the aggregate dynamics characterized in Proposition 1 are approximately neutral with
respect to (that is, invariant to) the ﬁxed adjustment cost. 
4.1. Some preliminary lemmas 
Our analysis in this section begins by describing two intermediate results that inform the neutrality result. These reveal
two key properties of the ﬁrm’s optimal labor demand policy in the neighborhood of a small ﬁxed adjustment cost. The
ﬁrst intermediate result reiterates the insights of Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Mankiw (1985) to argue that the case of
a small ﬁxed cost is particularly instructive, because even small adjustment frictions imply substantial inaction, and hence
lumpiness, in microeconomic adjustment. Speciﬁcally, the presence of a ﬁxed adjustment cost induces inaction bands that
are ﬁrst order in C 1/2 , and so our approach uses Taylor series expansions of relevant functions in C 1/2 around the frictionless
limit, C 1 / 2 = 0 . 7 We denote functions evaluated at C 1 / 2 = 0 by a superscript 
 ; for example, X 
 ( · ) refers to the frictionless
reset policy. 
Lemma 1. The adjustment triggers satisfy, for all n , 
L ( n ) = X 
 ( n ) − γ ( n ) C 1 / 2 + ( n ) C + O 
(
C 3 / 2 
)
, and 
U ( n ) = X 
 ( n ) + γ ( n ) C 1 / 2 + ( n ) C + O 
(
C 3 / 2 
)
, (11) 
and their inverses satisfy, for all x , 
L −1 ( x ) = X 
 −1 ( x ) + γ¯ ( x ) C 1 / 2 + ¯( x ) C + O 
(
C 3 / 2 
)
, and 
U −1 ( x ) = X 
 −1 ( x ) − γ¯ ( x ) C 1 / 2 + ¯( x ) C + O 
(
C 3 / 2 
)
, (12) 
where γ ( n ) = X 
 ′ ( n ) ¯γ [ X 
 ( n ) ] . 
Lemma 1 implies that the adjustment triggers and their inverses that feature prominently in Proposition 1 are approx-
imately symmetric around their corresponding reset rules, with a band of inaction proportional to the square root of the
adjustment friction. It follows that even second-order small adjustment costs—that is, C = ε 2 —generate ﬁrst-order inaction
bands—for example, U ( n ) − L (n ) ∝ ε. The functions γ ( n ) and γ¯ ( x ) reﬂect the curvature in the return to adjusting, and there-
fore mediate the effect of the adjustment cost on the adjustment triggers. They are linked by the change of variables relation
γ ( n ) = X 
 ′ ( n ) ¯γ [ X 
 ( n ) ] , which maps units of employment to units of productivity. 
The second intermediate result we will exploit extends the original insights of Gertler and Leahy (2008) to provide a
sharper characterization of the optimal policy. A corollary of their Simpliﬁcation Theorem for our environment is that the
optimal policy approximately coincides with its myopic (that is, β = 0 ) counterpart in the neighborhood of a small ﬁxed
adjustment cost. That is, an excellent approximation to optimal dynamic labor demand can be obtained simply by solving
for the functions L ( n ), X ( n ), and U ( n ) associated with the corresponding static problem. As stressed by Gertler and Leahy,
an important ingredient in this result is the presence of two-sided adjustment —that is, that both upward and downward ad-
justments occur with positive probability in each state. Indeed, Lemma 2 establishes that, if two-sided adjustment obtains,
myopia is approximately optimal given any ﬁrst-order Markov process for x satisfying A2. This generalizes the insight in
Gertler and Leahy, whose analysis considered a particular process for idiosyncratic shocks consistent with two-sided adjust-
ment. 
Lemma 2. The expected future value of the ﬁrm is independent of current employment n up to third order in C 1/2 . The reset
policy thus satisﬁes X ( n ) = X 
 ( n ) + O 
(
C 3 / 2 
)
, for all n. 
The intuition behind the result is straightforward. Note ﬁrst that current employment affects future proﬁts only in the
event that the ﬁrm does not adjust in the subsequent period—that is, if x ′ ∈ [ L ( n ), U ( n )]. From Lemma 1 , the width of the
inaction band is of order C 1/2 . One can show, then, that the probability of inaction is also of order C 1/2 . In addition, by
optimality, the return to inaction realized in this event, 0 
(
n, x ′ 
)
−
[

(
x ′ 
)
−C 
]
, is of order C —it must be bounded from
below by zero (otherwise the ﬁrm will choose to adjust) and from above by the adjustment cost C (since inaction cannot
dominate costless adjustment, 0 ( n , x ′ ) ≤( x ′ )). It follows that the effect of n on the future value of the ﬁrm, via its role
in the expected value of inaction, is of order C 3/2 . The effect of ignoring this term on the ﬁrm’s proﬁts is negligible, and the
ﬁrm’s problem thus approximates the β = 0 case. 7 Several authors have explored two-sided adjustment in continuous-time models with Brownian disturbances (see Barro, 1972 ; Dixit, 1991 ). In the 
continuous-time limit, additional smooth pasting conditions pin down the ﬁrm’s marginal value at the adjustment barriers, as the ﬁrm faces the prospect 
of an unboundedly large number of adjustments at these barriers in the presence of Brownian shocks. These conditions in turn imply additional smoothness 
in the ﬁrm’s value, and thereby a wider band of inaction that is proportional to C 1/4 in the continuous-time limit, as opposed to C 1/2 away from that limit. 
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 A key implication of Lemma 2 for what follows is that the reset policy X ( n ) approximately coincides with its frictionless
counterpart X 
 ( n ), since it approximately satisﬁes the frictionless ﬁrst-order condition, pX 
 ( n ) F n ( n ) ≡ w . An important corol-
lary is that the density of employment mandated by the reset policy if the adjustment cost were suspended momentarily ,
h ∗( n ), approximately coincides with the frictionless density of employment that would result if the adjustment cost were
suspended indeﬁnitely , h ∗( n ) = h 
 ( n ) + O 
(
C 3 / 2 
)
. 
4.2. The neutrality result 
We are now prepared to state the main result of this section, and the key result of the paper, which demonstrates
that aggregate dynamics are approximately neutral to the adjustment cost. The differentiability properties summarized in
assumptions A1 and A2 facilitate the Taylor series expansions that are used to derive this result. Later, in Section 5 , we
examine the implications of violations of A2 for a compound-Poisson process for x proposed in recent literature ( Gertler
and Leahy, 2008; Midrigan, 2011 ). 
Proposition 2 (Neutrality) . The evolution of the density of employment across ﬁrms preserves the property 
h ( n ) = h 
 ( n ) + O 
(
C 3 / 2 
)
, (13)
for all n and . 
Proposition 2 has the following interpretation: If, in some initial period, the density of employment h −1 ( n ) across ﬁrms
equals its frictionless counterpart h 
 −1 ( n ) up to terms that are third order (in C 
1/2 ), the same will be true of the ﬁrm-
size density in all subsequent periods, for any sequence of aggregate shocks. For example, imagine that, at an arbitrarily
distant date in the past, C = 0 . Trivially, the ﬁrm size density in this period satisﬁes (13) . If a (plausibly small) C > 0 is then
introduced, and remains in place, Proposition 2 states that (13) will continue to hold. In this sense, the initial condition in
(13) is not a strong restriction, insofar as it must hold only at some point in history. 
This neutrality result is surprising in a number of respects. First, it is not anticipated by the general representation
of aggregation dynamics in Proposition 1 . Second, it holds for any aggregate state , which includes current and future
expectations of market wages. Thus, the neutrality result in Proposition 2 is not the outcome of equilibrium adjustment in
wages; it emerges purely from the aggregation of microeconomic behavior. Of course, an implication of the latter is that,
since neutrality obtains for any , a fortiori it also will hold for the equilibrium . 
The key to understanding the neutrality result can be traced to a symmetry property in the distributional dynamics of
h ( n ). To see this, it is helpful to rewrite the law of motion for h ( n ) in Eq. (9) more directly in terms of its constituent ﬂows
as 
h ( n ) = Pr ( adjust to n ) h ∗( n ) − Pr ( adjust from n ) h −1 ( n ) . (14)
To see how this sheds light on the source of approximate neutrality, imagine a small ﬁxed adjustment cost is introduced
into an otherwise frictionless environment. At any instant of time, the adjustment cost reduces the outﬂow from any given
level of employment n , but also reduces the density of ﬁrms which ﬁnd it optimal to adjust to that level of employment.
For small frictions, we show that these two forces are symmetric, leaving the density approximately equal to its frictionless
counterpart along the transition path. 
It is possible to illustrate this argument more formally if we again assume i.i.d. productivity shocks. Recall that, relative
to the frictionless case, the introduction of an adjustment cost reduces the outﬂow from h ( n ) by 
h −1 ( n ) ( G [ U ( n ) ] − G [ L ( n ) ] ) . (15)
Among ﬁrms positioned at n , a share G [ U ( n ) ] − G [ L ( n ) ] of ﬁrms choose not to adjust. Likewise, the inﬂow to h ( n ) is reduced
at each instant, relative to the frictionless case, by 
h ∗( n ) 
(
H −1 
[
L −1 X ( n ) 
]
− H −1 
[
U −1 X ( n ) 
])
. (16)
Of the density h ∗( n ) of ﬁrms for whom n is the mandated level of employment, a share of these ﬁrms equal to
H −1 
[
L −1 X ( n ) 
]
− H −1 
[
U −1 X ( n ) 
]
will choose not to adjust. An approximation to each of the latter expressions around the
frictionless optimum reveals that the reductions in both ﬂows converge in the presence of a small adjustment cost. Speciﬁ-
cally, noting the form of the adjustment triggers in Lemma 1 , Taylor series approximations of G [ U ( n )] and G [ L ( n )] in orders
of C 1/2 around C 1 / 2 = 0 imply that 
G [ U ( n ) ] − G [ L ( n ) ] = 2 g [ X 
 ( n ) ] γ ( n ) C 1 / 2 + O 
(
C 3 / 2 
)
. (17)
Likewise, applying Lemmas 1 and 2 one can show that 
H −1 
[
L −1 X ( n ) 
]
− H −1 
[
U −1 X ( n ) 
]
= 2 h −1 ( n ) ¯γ [ X 
 ( n ) ] C 1 / 2 + O 
(
C 3 / 2 
)
. (18)
Recalling the change of variables γ ( n ) = X 
 ′ ( n ) ¯γ [ X 
 ( n ) ] , and that the mandated density is approximated by its frictionless
counterpart h ∗( n ) = h 
 ( n ) + O 
(
C 3 / 2 
)
, where h 
 ( n ) ≡X 
 ′ ( n ) g [ X 
 ( n )], it follows that the reductions in outﬂows (15) and inﬂows
(16) converge in the presence of a small adjustment cost, and are given by 
2 h −1 ( n ) h 
 ( n ) ¯γ [ X 
 ( n ) ] C 1 / 2 + O 
(
C 3 / 2 
)
. (19)
136 M.W.L. Elsby, R. Michaels / Journal of Monetary Economics 101 (2019) 128–147 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 It follows that the frictionless density at any given n is preserved along the transition path up to terms of order greater than
C . 
A key observation is the dual, symmetric roles played by the densities of inherited and frictionless employment levels,
h −1 ( n ) and h 
 ( n ), in Eq. (19) . Holding constant h 
 ( n ), a large density of inherited employment, h −1 ( n ) , implies that a lot of
density is “trapped” at n , reducing the outﬂow from that position. But, it also implies that there exists relatively little density
at inherited employment levels suﬃciently different from n that adjusting to n is optimal, reducing the inﬂow : h −1 ( n ) affects
the approximate reduction in outﬂows and inﬂows symmetrically . Analogously, holding constant h −1 ( n ) , a greater density of
frictionless employment at n , h 
 ( n ), implies that a smaller density of ﬁrms ﬁnds it optimal to adjust away from n , reducing
the outﬂow. But, it also will imply that a greater density of ﬁrms who would prefer to move to n will be prevented from
doing so, reducing the inﬂow. These two forces offset, and approximate dynamic neutrality obtains. 
4.3. The roles of heterogeneity and two-sided adjustment 
To develop understanding of Proposition 2 , we highlight two further aspects of the neutrality result that sharpen its in-
terpretation. First, Proposition 2 requires that orders of the adjustment cost greater than C be small enough to be considered
negligible. Under certain restrictions, there is a more precise metric by which the smallness of C can be evaluated. Consider
the family of distributions of idiosyncratic productivity such that G ( x ) = ˜ G [ ( x − μ) /σ ] , where μ is a location parameter, and
σ a scale parameter that captures dispersion. 8 Then, for example, the reduction in the outﬂow in Eq. (15) above is given by
h −1 ( n ) 
[
2 ˜  g
(
X 
 ( n ) − μ
σ
)
γ ( n ) 
(
C 1 / 2 
σ
)
+ O 
(
C 3 / 2 
σ 3 
)]
. (20) 
Thus, the accuracy of the approximations underlying Proposition 2 hinges on the magnitude of the (square root of the)
adjustment cost relative to the dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks σ . To see why, recall that the term in brackets is simply
the probability of inaction. The approximations obtain if the latter is not very large (though considerable inaction is per-
mitted). The incentive to adjust, in turn, depends on the size of desired adjustments—as governed by the size of changes in
productivity—relative to the cost of adjusting. This is captured by C 1/2 / σ . Alvarez and Lippi (2014) note the same point using
different analytical techniques in a continuous-time Brownian model of price setting. We shall see later that this observation
informs our understanding of the quantitative dynamics of the model under alternative calibrations of the adjustment cost
C and the dispersion of shocks σ . 
The second implication of the neutrality result in Proposition 2 that we wish to highlight is the important role of two-
sided adjustment—that is, that there exists a positive probability of both hiring and ﬁring workers in each state. To see
why this matters, return to the i.i.d. special case, and imagine that the probability of reducing employment G [ L ( n ) ] = 0
for some employment level n , so that adjustment is one-sided upward. The approximations underlying Lemma 2 and
Proposition 2 will fail in this case. The reason is that the inaction rate G [ U ( n ) ] − G [ L ( n ) ] = G [ U ( n ) ] ceases to be (approxi-
mately) proportional to C 1/2 , and symmetry is violated. 9 
Any departures from two-sided adjustment in our environment are very limited and, as we shall see, quantitatively
unimportant. Here we highlight two examples. First, in the presence of a lump-sum ﬁxed adjustment cost and a lower
bound on the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks, it is possible that the lower adjustment trigger L ( n ) dips below the lower
support of x at small employment levels—(very) small ﬁrms will adjust only upward. A second, related example is the case
in which employment attrits exogenously at rate δ in the absence of adjustment. The Supplementary Material establishes
that Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 remain intact under attrition, provided δ is not so large that adjustment becomes one-sided
(the ﬁrm only hires). 10 
4.4. Applications to capital and price adjustment 
Our analysis thus far has been cast in the context of a dynamic labor demand problem. We noted earlier, however, that
our results apply equally to canonical models of capital and price adjustment. Here, we brieﬂy explain why. We shall see
later that this clear isomorphism aids the comparison of the results noted above with prior literature which spans these
related employment, capital and price adjustment problems. 8 This so-called “location-scale” family of distributions encompasses a variety of commonly-used distributions, including Type-I extreme value, logistic, 
normal, and exponential distributions, among others. 
9 Speciﬁcally, G [ U ( n ) ] − G [ L ( n ) ] = G [ U ( n ) ] = G [ X 
 ( n ) ] + g [ X 
 ( n ) ] γ ( n ) C 1 / 2 + O ( C ) in this case, as opposed to 2 g [ X 
 ( n ) ] γ ( n ) C 1 / 2 + O 
(
C 3 / 2 
)
in the case of 
two-sided adjustment. 
10 In their analysis of a menu cost model, Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) show that the optimal reset price is higher when there is drift in the aggregate 
price level, that is, inﬂation. The reason drift inﬂuences the reset price, and thus the reason symmetry fails to obtain, is that adjustment is one-sided in 
their model, since there are no idiosyncratic shocks. 
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 4.4.1. Capital adjustment 
Reinterpretation of our results for the case of capital adjustment is especially straightforward. The canonical decision
problem faced by a ﬁrm is given by: 
( k −1 , x ;) ≡ max 
k 
{
pxF ( k ) − Rk −C1  + βE 
[

(
k, x ′ ;′ 
)| x, ]}, (21)
where k denotes capital, and R the rental rate on capital. 11 By direct analogy to the labor demand case, the aggregate
state  will include the rental rate R , aggregate productivity p , and any information pertaining to their future evolution—
in particular, perceptions of the current and future distributions of capital. The isomorphism is thus clear: one can pass
from (1) to (21) simply by replacing n with k , and w with R . It follows that the equilibrium outcome also will coincide
approximately with the frictionless equilibrium. 
It is worth re-emphasizing here that the Supplementary Material establishes that approximate neutrality also holds in
the presence of depreciation, which is especially applicable to the case of capital adjustment. Depreciation lowers all three
policy functions, L ( n ), X ( n ) and U ( n ), in approximately the same way: Firms are more likely to adjust upward, choose higher
levels of k conditional on adjusting, and are less likely to adjust downward. This preserves the symmetry of the problem
that underlies the neutrality result. Note that the symmetry required for neutrality therefore does not require symmetry of
adjustment—neutrality holds in this case even though ﬁrms are more likely to adjust upward than downward. 
4.4.2. Price adjustment 
The problem of price setting under ﬁxed menu costs has a similar structure. Consider a ﬁrm facing an isoelastic demand
schedule of the form y = ( p/P ) −Y, where p is the ﬁrm’s price; P is the aggregate price level; Y is real aggregate output;
and  > 1 is the elasticity of product demand. If the ﬁrm operates a linear production function y = xn, and faces a market
wage w, then one can re-cast the ﬁrm’s problem as one of choosing the transformed price q ≡ p − : 
( q −1 , x ;) ≡ max 
q 
{ 
Z q α − Z 
(
w 
x 
)
q −C1  + βE 
[

(
q, x ′ ;′ 
)| x, ]} , (22)
where α ≡ (  − 1 ) / ∈ ( 0 , 1 ) , and Z ≡ P Y is a measure of nominal aggregate demand. Again, the form of (22) has a similar
structure to the baseline model of Section 2 , but where the aggregate state  is now comprised of the market wage w,
nominal aggregate demand Z , and perceptions of current and future distributions of prices. Once again, then, the aggregation
and neutrality results of Propositions 1 and 2 apply to this pricing problem. 
4.5. Relation to the literature 
It is instructive to compare our neutrality result in Proposition 2 with related results in the prior literature. Caplin and
Spulber (1987) were the ﬁrst to note the possibility of aggregate neutrality in the presence of lumpy microeconomic ad-
justment in a related pricing problem. They consider a very simple environment without idiosyncratic shocks and with
one-sided Ss adjustment. Their ingenious result is that an invariant uniform cross-sectional distribution will be preserved
in such an economy, and that aggregate outcomes are unaffected by the adjustment cost: Common shocks move all ﬁrms
in the same direction in the Ss band, and ﬁrms induced to adjust at the bottom of the uniform distribution exactly replace
those displaced at the top of the distribution. 
Our neutrality result in Proposition 2 shares a common theme with Caplin and Spulber’s, in the sense that both emerge
from a form of symmetry in the model’s distributional dynamics. It is interesting that the two models share this theme de-
spite the important difference that we consider an environment with idiosyncratic heterogeneity, and two-sided adjustment.
Golosov and Lucas (2007) add precisely the ingredients of our baseline model to Caplin and Spulber’s problem. In their
numerical solution of the model, they indeed ﬁnd very small effects of money on aggregate output. Golosov and Lucas
suggest that the robustness of Caplin and Spulber’s neutrality result stems from a property of the Ss models referred to as
the selection effect . The idea is that ﬁrms that adjust are those that wish to change their price by a lot. Hence, the claim is
that, although many ﬁrms do not adjust, the aggregate adjustments are large, and neutrality obtains. 
The notion of a selection effect from Golosov and Lucas is formalized in the symmetry result underlying Proposition 2 .
To see this, recall the symmetric effect of h −1 ( n ) on the inﬂows to and outﬂows from n . As we noted, if h −1 ( n ) is large,
then many ﬁrms are “trapped” at n , and outﬂows from this position are reduced. But, it also means there are many ﬁrms
near n . These ﬁrms are less likely to select into n if it is their desired choice, since the small increase in proﬁts does not
outweigh the adjustment cost C . This latter, symmetric reduction in the inﬂows to n is an expression of the selection effect.
Hence, our characterization of symmetry in the distributional dynamics formalizes the intuition gleaned from Golosov and
Lucas’ numerical analysis. 
A more recent literature has emphasized the role of equilibrium adjustment in market prices in unwinding the aggregate
effects of lumpy adjustment (see House, 2014; Khan and Thomas, 2008; Veracierto, 2002 ). It is important to note that the
neutrality result in Proposition 2 is quite distinct from these channels. Speciﬁcally, Proposition 2 suggests that approximate
neutrality holds for any aggregate state—which includes the wage—that is, regardless of aggregate price movements. What11 A standard user cost argument implies that the rental rate R can in turn be related to the price of capital P k according to R ≡ P k − β( 1 − δ) E 
[
P ′ 
k 
]
. 
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Table 1 
Baseline parameter values. 
Parameter Meaning Value Reason 
α Returns to scale 0.64 Cooper et al. (2015) 
β Discount factor 0.99 Quarterly real interest rate = 1% 
C /E( y ) Adj. cost/Avg. revenue 0.08 Cooper et al. (2015) and Bloom (2009) 
ρx Persistence of x 0.70 Cooper et al. (2015) and Foster et al. (2008) 
σ x Std. dev. of innovation to x 0.35 Cooper et al. (2007, 2015) 
ρp Persistence of p 0.95 Autocorrelation of detrended log N 
σ p Std. dev. of innovation to p 0.015 Std. dev. of detrended log N 
δ Worker attrition rate 0.06 Quarterly quit rate (JOLTS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 is at the heart of Proposition 2 is an aggregation result that emerges from the symmetry in the distributional dynamics of
h ( n ). 12 
Finally, recent numerical analyses have found that deviations from frictionless dynamics can be more signiﬁcant than
implied by Proposition 2 , if market prices are ﬁxed ( Khan and Thomas, 2008; King and Thomas, 2006 ). Our results suggest
that these deviations arise from disruptions of symmetry. In the next section, we show that this can occur when the ad-
justment cost is large enough relative to idiosyncratic dispersion to violate the approximations underlying Proposition 2 . We
now turn to these, and related, quantitative issues. 
5. Quantitative analysis 
Proposition 2 implies that a ﬁxed adjustment cost that induces ﬁrst-order rates of inaction will induce deviations from
frictionless aggregate dynamics that are only third-order. A natural question in the light of this is whether these third-
order deviations are also quantitatively small under plausible parameterizations of such models. We address this question in
Section 5.1 by parameterizing the model using conventional estimates. We then study the effects of alternative calibrations
of the parameters of the model in Section 5.2 , and use this to contrast our results with recent quantitative analyses in the
related literature. Finally, in Section 5.3 we illustrate analytically how one particular extension of the baseline model can
generate aggregate non-neutralities by breaking the symmetry underlying Proposition 2 . 
5.1. Baseline quantitative analysis 
The baseline parameterization we use is summarized in Table 1 . The numerical model is cast at a quarterly frequency.
We adopt the widespread assumption that the production function takes the Cobb–Douglas form, F ( n ) = n α, with α < 1.
The returns to scale parameter α is set equal to 0.64 based on estimates reported in Cooper et al. (2007, 2015) . This also
is similar to the value assumed by King and Thomas (2006) . The discount factor β is set to 0.99, which is the conventional
choice for a quarterly model. 
The magnitude of the adjustment cost is based on estimates reported in Cooper et al. (2015) and Bloom (2009) .
Cooper et al. (2015) estimate a model similar to the one described above using plant-level data from the Census’ Longi-
tudinal Research Database. In one of their better-ﬁtting speciﬁcations, they estimate a cost of adjustment equal to 8 percent
of quarterly revenue (see row “Disrupt” in their Table 4a). Using annual Compustat data, Bloom (2009) ﬁnds nearly the
same result, once it is converted to a quarterly frequency (see column “All” in his Table 3). Based on this, we set the ad-
justment cost parameter C to replicate these estimates. It turns out that this value of C also implies an average frequency
of adjustment that is comparable to what is observed in U.S. establishment-level data. In particular, it yields an estimate of
the average quarterly probability of adjusting of 56%, as compared to 48.5% in U.S. data. 13 
Idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks are assumed respectively to evolve according to the common assumption of geometric
AR(1) processes, 
log x ′ = μx + ρx log x + ε ′ x , and (23) 
log p ′ = μp + ρp log p + ε ′ p , (24) 
where the innovations are independent normal random variables: ε ′ x ∼ N 
(
0 , σ 2 x 
)
, and ε ′ p ∼ N 
(
0 , σ 2 p 
)
. This baseline parame-
terization in (23) is again informed by Cooper et al. (2007, 2015) , since they recover estimates within related labor demand
models. Their estimates of σ x range from about 0.2 (in their 2007 paper) to 0.5 (in their 2015 paper). We split the difference
and set σ x to be 0.35. However, it has been noted that these papers’ estimates of ρx , most of which are below 0.5, appear12 Of course, this does not preclude that equilibrium price adjustment can weaken the effects of lumpy adjustment on aggregate dynamics in cases where 
the approximations underlying Proposition 2 do not hold. 
13 This estimate is available from the BLS Business Employment Dynamics program. See http://www.bls.gov/bdm/bdsoc.htm . We take the average over the 
full sample, 1992q3 to 2013q2. 
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Fig. 2. Steady-state H ( n ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 rather low relative to other estimates in the literature; Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and Foster et al. (2008) each recover
estimates of ρx near 0.95. Again, we split the difference and set ρx = 0 . 7 , which is close to the midpoint of this wider range
of estimates, and also close to that estimated in Abraham and White (2006) using U.S. manufacturing data. This baseline
parameterization is comparable to that used in Bachmann’s (2013) analysis of non-convex adjustment costs. 
The parameters of the process of aggregate shocks, ρp and σ p , are calibrated so that the model approximately replicates
the persistence and volatility of (de-trended) log aggregate employment. Using postwar quarterly time series on private
payroll employment, and detrending using an HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 10 5 , we compute an autocorrelation co-
eﬃcient of 0.96 and a standard deviation of 0.025. Values of ρp = 0 . 95 and σp = 0 . 015 are roughly consistent with these
moments (see Table 1 ). We do this because our goal is not to explain the volatility of aggregate employment, but to com-
pare model outcomes within an environment that is economically relevant. One way of doing that is to generate aggregate
outcomes that are comparable to what we observe in the data. 
Lastly, as noted at the conclusion of Section 2 , we have generalized the analysis of Sections 3 and 4 to allow for worker
attrition. Accordingly, we have incorporated a constant rate of attrition, δ, into our quantitative analysis. To calibrate δ, we
use the simple average of the quarterly quit rate from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. This is 6%. 
As stressed in Proposition 2 , approximate neutrality obtains for any given aggregate state, which includes the wage,
and thus is not an outcome of equilibrium price adjustment. It is, instead, an aggregation result that relies only on the
symmetry in the distributional dynamics. To emphasize this point, we simulate the model for a ﬁxed wage. The latter is
chosen to induce an average ﬁrm size of 20, which is in line with evidence from the Census’ Business Dynamics Statistics. 14
Appendix D of the Supplementary Material discusses how to implement the model in general equilibrium and presents
impulse responses in this case. The results for the baseline parameterization are virtually identical to what we present here.
Since the wage is ﬁxed, ﬁrms do not need to forecast future wages. This means, in turn, that they do not need to fore-
cast future employment distributions. Therefore, the aggregate state  is summarized completely by aggregate productivity
p , and the optimal policy functions take the simple form L ( n ; p ), X ( n ; p ), and U ( n ; p ). As we noted in Section 2 , a positive in-
novation to aggregate productivity p shifts these functions downward—for a given level of idiosyncratic productivity, a ﬁrm
is more likely to hire, less likely to ﬁre, and will select a higher level of employment conditional on adjustment. Thus, the
evolution of aggregate productivity p induces shifts in the policy function, which, via the law of motion (9) , trace out the
evolution of the distribution of employment and thereby aggregate employment. 
The results of this exercise under the baseline calibration are illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3 . We begin in Fig. 2 by analyzing
the properties of the steady-state distribution of employment that would be attained in the absence of aggregate shocks.
The latter is compared to two reference distributions. The ﬁrst is the frictionless distribution. The second is the distribution
induced by a myopic labor demand policy, in reference to Lemma 2 . 
Fig. 2 reveals that the steady-state distribution of employment mimics closely its myopic and frictionless counterparts
at virtually all employment levels. As foreshadowed by the discussion in Section 4.3 highlighting the important role of
heterogeneity and two-sided adjustment, any deviations that do emerge are restricted to very small ﬁrm sizes of fewer
than two workers. Moreover, these discrepancies are very small in practice. Fig. 2 thus reveals that the neutrality of the14 See http://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/data _ estab.html . We compute the average ﬁrm size over the full sample for the years 1977–2011. 
140 M.W.L. Elsby, R. Michaels / Journal of Monetary Economics 101 (2019) 128–147 
Fig. 3. Dynamic response in baseline parameterization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 dynamics of the ﬁrm size distribution implied by Proposition 2 also holds in steady state for conventional parameterizations
of an employment adjustment problem. 
In Fig. 3 we turn to the dynamic implications of the model. Panel A presents the impulse response of aggregate em-
ployment to a one-percent positive innovation to aggregate labor productivity p implied by the baseline parameterization,
and contrasts it with its frictionless ( C = 0 ) and myopic ( β = 0 and C > 0) counterparts. The differences between the im-
pulse responses are so small as to be almost imperceptible. Thus, the prediction of approximate dynamic neutrality in
Proposition 2 is not merely a theoretical curiosity; it holds under an empirically-relevant set of parameters. 
The source of this approximate neutrality is illustrated in panel B of Fig. 3 . This exercise is informed by the emphasis of
Proposition 2 on the symmetry of the effects of adjustment frictions on the ﬂows in and out of the mass at each employ-
ment level. In particular, rearranging the identity in Eq. (14) , multiplying through by n , and integrating yields the following
description of the relation between actual and frictionless aggregate employment: 
N = N ∗ + 
∫ 
n [ reduction in outﬂows ( n ) ] d n −
∫ 
n [ reduction in inﬂows ( n ) ] d n. (25) 
Here N ≡∫ nh ( n )d n is aggregate employment in the baseline (forward-looking) model and N ∗ ≡∫ nh ∗( n )d n is its mandated
counterpart. The aggregate effects of the adjustment cost are thus mediated by the ﬁnal two terms on the right-hand side
of (25) . These represent the employment-weighted reductions, relative to the frictionless model, in the ﬂows in and out
of each employment level. Panel B of Fig. 3 plots the impulse responses of these two terms, normalized by pre-impulse
aggregate employment. 15 
Two results emerge from the exercise in Fig. 3 B. First, the aggregate reductions in the inﬂows and outﬂows induced by
the ﬁxed cost are substantial. At their peak, each amounts to about 20% of steady-state employment. In this sense, the ﬁxed
adjustment cost does disrupt signiﬁcantly the ﬂows to and from each point along the distribution. Second, as predicted by
the neutrality result in Proposition 2 , the effect of the adjustment cost on the inﬂows is almost perfectly offset by its effect
on the outﬂows. At no point does the difference exceed 0.6 of one percent. Moreover, the two series move in tandem. This
illustrates the symmetry in the distributional dynamics that underlies the approximately frictionless aggregate dynamics in
the model. 
Interestingly, these quantitative results dovetail with recent literature on dynamic factor demand that has solved nu-
merical models of ﬁxed adjustment costs under speciﬁc parametric assumptions. Our ﬁnding that aggregate dynamics are
approximately invariant with respect to the ﬁxed cost evokes the ﬁndings of Cooper et al. (1999) and Cooper and Halti-
wanger (2006) , whose estimates imply that, in the case of capital adjustment, aggregation smooths away much of the effect
of nonconvex adjustment frictions. 15 Formally, these are calculated by generalizing the i.i.d. case, expressed in (15) , to account for persistent shocks. For example, the reduction in outﬂows 
is computed as h −1 ( n ) ( G [ U ( n ) | n ] − G [ L ( n ) | n ] ) . 
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 5.2. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we investigate the robustness of the results presented thus far. We consider plausible variations on the
baseline parameterization based on six experiments. 
5.2.1. Raising C relative to σx 
The ﬁrst two experiments investigate the effects of alternative choices of the adjustment cost C and the dispersion of
idiosyncratic shocks σ x . These exercises are motivated by the discussion of Section 4.3 , which highlights the crucial role of
the magnitude of C relative to σ x in the neutrality result in Proposition 2 . 
Panel A of Fig. 4 considers the effects of increasing C so that the adjustment cost is 16% of revenue, on average, across
ﬁrms. This corresponds to a two-standard error increase above Bloom’s (2009) estimate. Likewise, in panel B of Fig. 4 , we
lower the standard deviation of innovations to idiosyncratic productivity σ x to 0.2, in line with the lower end of estimates
in the literature surveyed in Section 5.1 . To hold all else equal, for Panel B we adjust C so that it continues to equal 8%
of revenue, on average. As before, we compare these impulse responses to their frictionless counterparts, and illustrate the
corresponding reductions in the constituent ﬂows outlined in equation (25) . 16 
Both of these experiments lower rates of adjustment: Average quarterly adjustment probabilities are 44% in the param-
eterization underlying Fig. 4 A, and 28% in that underlying Fig. 4 B. This greater degree of inaction is in turn reﬂected in
the impulse responses in Fig. 4 A and B. The latter in particular reveals a modest hump-shape, with a peak response after
just one quarter, and almost frictionless dynamics thereafter. The contrast with Fig. 3 is consistent with our interpretation
of Proposition 2 , which revealed that symmetry is likely to fail if productive heterogeneity is more limited relative to the
adjustment friction. But, the magnitudes of the deviations remain small. 
5.2.2. Matching the frequency and size of adjustments 
The latter experiments have counterfactual implications for rates of employment adjustment, however. As noted above,
the empirical rate of employment adjustment is much higher than that underlying Fig. 4 B, at 48.5% in U.S. establishment-
level data. For this reason, in our third experiment we explore the effects of calibrating the adjustment cost C and the
dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks σ x to target two salient moments of the cross-establishment distribution of employment
growth: the average quarterly frequency of adjusting of 48.5%; and the average absolute quarterly log change in employment
among adjusters, which is 0.31. 17 This exercise signiﬁcantly reduces the adjustment cost to just 0.36% of average quarterly
revenue, as well as the degree of idiosyncratic dispersion σ x , which falls to 0.08. 
Panel C of Fig. 4 presents the results of this experiment. Reiterating the important role of the rate of adjustment in
the approximations underlying Proposition 2, Fig. 4 C reveals that this alternative calibration strategy largely restores the
neutrality result noted in the baseline case in Fig. 3 : the impulse response is almost indistingushable from the frictionless
analogue. The message of this experiment is that Proposition 2 is quantitatively relevant in a calibration that replicates key
aspects of the cross section of employment growth. 
5.2.3. Varying idiosyncratic persistence, ρx 
We noted earlier that leading estimates of the persistence of idiosyncratic productivity shocks ρx vary widely across
studies. A common intuition is that ﬁrms should adjust less aggressively to idiosyncratic shocks if productivity is more
transitory in order to position employment so it is optimal given expected future reversion to mean in productivity. However,
the myopic approximation in Lemma 2 suggests the payoff to this foresight is small. For this reason, Proposition 2 suggests
that the lack of empirical consensus over ρx is inessential to the presence or otherwise of approximate aggregate neutrality—
the result holds independently of ρx . Motivated by this, in a fourth experiment we consider the effects of lowering ρx to
0.4 (in line with the majority of Cooper et al.’s estimates), and of raising ρx to 0.9 (closer to the estimates of Foster et al.).
Panel D of Fig. 4 illustrates the results and conﬁrms the predictions of Proposition 2 : Changing ρx has almost no effect on
the impulse response of aggregate employment, which continues to track its frictionless path. 
5.2.4. Stochastic adjustment costs 
Our baseline model assumes a lump-sum ﬁxed cost, C . A common alternative speciﬁcation adopted in recent literature is
one whereby the adjustment cost is drawn each period from a given distribution. It is straightforward to incorporate such
stochastic ﬁxed costs into the above model and to (re-)prove our propositions. Suppose that ﬁxed costs are drawn from a
distribution with upper support, C¯ . If C¯ is small (in the sense discussed in Section 4 ), then the approximation to the adjust-
ment triggers in Lemma 1 can be applied for any C < C¯ . Moreover, under this assumption, the order-of-magnitude argument
behind the optimality of myopia in Lemma 2 also is preserved. As a result, one can adapt the approach of Section 4 to show
that, to a ﬁrst-order approximation, the neutrality result in Proposition 2 remains intact. 16 To avoid clutter, we omit the impulse responses generated by the myopic model. In each case, these are very similar to the impulse responses in the 
baseline model. 
17 Thanks to David Ratner, who provided these estimates from BLS Business Employment Dynamics (BED) microdata. The latter record quarterly employ- 
ment for nearly 75% of U.S. establishments. 
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 To pursue this argument further, Fig. 4 E plots the implied impulse responses for aggregate employment from a version of
the baseline model in which ﬁrms take i.i.d. draws of ﬁxed costs from a uniform distribution bounded below by 0 and above
by C¯ , as in King and Thomas (2006) . All other parameters in the baseline case are retained. We consider two parameteriza-
tions of C¯ . The ﬁrst sets C¯ to the value of the lump-sum ﬁxed cost used in the baseline calibration. The second chooses C¯ so
that the average probability of adjusting coincides with its value in the baseline calibration. The results of Fig. 4 E conﬁrm
that the presence of stochastic ﬁxed adjustment costs per se has little effect on the baseline results. 
5.2.5. Size-dependent adjustment costs 
A second alternative speciﬁcation of adjustment costs used in recent literature has been to scale these costs by some
measure of ﬁrm size, so that ﬁrms do not outgrow the friction. 18 Two common approaches have been implemented. First,
Caballero and Engel (1999) and Gertler and Leahy (2008) scale the adjustment cost to be proportional to frictionless revenue,
 = cy 
 (x ) ≡ cxF (n 
 (x )) . In a second speciﬁcation, the adjustment cost is modeled as a share of current revenue, C = cxF ( n ) .
This is the speciﬁcation used in Cooper et al. (2007, 2015) , Bloom (2009) , and Bachmann (2013) . Note that these cases imply
a certain asymmetry to the adjustment cost function. 
Consider ﬁrst the simpler case of C = cy 
 (x ) . Since this form of the adjustment cost is independent of the ﬁrm’s choice
of employment, its qualitative implications for the policy rule ( Lemmas 1 and 2 ) and thereby for the approximate neutrality
of the implied aggregate dynamics will be expected to mirror those derived above for the case of a lump-sum cost. Fig. 4 F
conﬁrms this expectation. It presents the implied impulse response in the case where c is set to replicate the average
adjustment rate in the baseline parameterization illustrated in Fig. 3 . It is almost indistinguishable from the frictionless
response. 
This extended result in turn aids interpretation of the more complicated case in which C = cxF ( n ) . The latter is increasing
in the choice of employment. It follows that the adjustment cost distorts the optimal level of employment conditional on
adjusting, n = X −1 ( x ; c ) , because it acts like a tax on increases in n . Thus, the key difference in this model is that the
distribution of mandated employment implied by this distorted reset policy will diverge from its frictionless analogue. All
other features resemble the case above where C = cy 
 (x ) . Therefore, it is natural to expect neutrality to obtain with respect
to the path of mandated, but not frictionless, aggregate employment. However, the deviations from the frictionless path are
quite small, as shown in Figure 4F. Relative to the simpler size-dependent case, a slight deviation emerges on impact, but
this is subsequently eliminated. 
5.3. Relation to the literature 
What emerges from the foregoing quantitative analysis is that the presence of a ﬁxed adjustment cost has, at most,
only a modest effect on aggregate dynamics under reasonable parameterizations, even in the absence of adjustment of
market prices. As in Proposition 2 , the source of these limited effects can be traced to the symmetric role of the adjustment
cost in reducing the ﬂows in and out of each position in the cross section. And, where (small) deviations in aggregate
dynamics do arise, it is in parameterizations that imply rates of adjustment signiﬁcantly lower than those seen in microdata
on employment. 
These observations share parallels in prior literature based on numerical work. For instance, King and
Thomas (2006) document deviations of aggregate dynamics with respect to the frictionless case when market prices are
ﬁxed, as they are in the simulations reported above. Gourio and Kashyap (2007) report similar quantitative ﬁndings in their
analysis of a related investment problem. For simplicity, however, the sole source of heterogeneity in both of these analyses
is (modest) variation in the form of a stochastic ﬁxed cost of adjustment; both studies abstract entirely from productive
heterogeneity, implicitly imposing that σx = 0 . The foregoing analysis thus suggests that the non-neutralities found in these
earlier studies are a consequence of the assumed absence of idiosyncratic heterogeneity. 19 
Important precedents in prior literature do allow for productive heterogeneity, however. Khan and Thomas (2008) provide
a calibration of a related investment model that successfully confronts several features of the data on plant-level investment.
The implied dispersion in productivity σ x is such that adjustment rates are signiﬁcantly lower than in our baseline case
above. 20 As foreshadowed by the interpretation of Proposition 2 , and the quantitative analysis in Fig. 4 B, Khan and Thomas
ﬁnd that deviations emerge between frictionless dynamics and the behavior of aggregate capital in the presence of the
adjustment costs, if market prices are ﬁxed. This suggests that calibrations similar to that summarized in Fig. 4 B may be
relevant to the case of capital adjustment. 
Our own analysis suggests that higher adjustment rates are more relevant for the case of labor demand, and that these
in turn imply aggregate dynamics almost indistinguishable from their frictionless counterpart. Interestingly, our results18 However, the probability of adjusting employment in BLS Business Employment Dynamics micro data does increase in establishment size. One inter- 
pretation is that it is consistent with a lump-sum friction. By contrast, formalizations of size-dependent costs typically imply that ﬁrms are never large 
relative to the adjustment cost, and thus fail to replicate this fact. 
19 Bachmann (2013) also ﬁnds that a ﬁxed adjustment cost model induces sluggish dynamics in aggregate employment. While his model allows for 
idiosyncratic risk comparable to that used in this paper, his calibration still implies a comparatively low adjustment rate. 
20 For example, Khan and Thomas’s calibration implies that 75% of plants would not adjust their capital stock in a given year, but for the fact that their 
model exempts very small adjustments from the adjustment cost. 
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 also suggest that estimates of the frequency of price adjustment imply very limited non-neutrality. The recent survey of
Klenow and Malin (2011) suggests that, after omitting many sales-related price changes, the mean (median) duration of
prices is about 7 (5.9) months. If price changes coinciding with product substitutions are excluded, the mean (median) du-
ration rises to 10 (8.3) months. 21 This range from 7 to 10 months is encompassed by Fig. 4 B and C; the latter implies a mean
duration of employment of a little more than 6 months, whereas the former yields a duration of almost 10.5 months. Thus,
recalling the isomorphism between our model and price-setting problems, we infer that leading estimates of the frequency
of price changes suggest dynamics of the aggregate price level that lie between the impulses responses in Fig. 4 B and C.
This represents a rather small departure from neutrality. 
5.4. Generating non-neutralities: an analytical illustration 
We close this section by highlighting how the analytical framework provided in this paper can help elucidate the sources
of non -neutralities. An inﬂuential strand of recent research has argued that the form of idiosyncratic shocks plays a cru-
cial role in shaping the aggregate effects of lumpy microeconomic adjustment. In particular, Gertler and Leahy (2008) and
Midrigan (2011) have studied environments in which idiosyncratic shocks evolve according to a compound Poisson process
whereby individual ﬁrms receive a shock with probability 1 − λ each period. Interestingly, they ﬁnd that this departure gives
rise to persistent aggregate dynamics, in contrast to the results of previous sections of this paper. 22 
In what follows, we show that the analysis and intuition of Sections 3 and 4 provide a novel perspective on the origins
of this result. In particular, we are able to trace this result analytically to a clear violation of symmetry in the distributional
dynamics. 
For clarity, consider the case in which idiosyncratic shocks are conditionally i.i.d. That is, with probability 1 − λ each
period ﬁrms receive an independent draw x ′ from a distribution function G ( x ′ ), while with probability λ no idiosyncratic
shock arrives and x ′ = x . 
As in Section 4 , our aim is to approximate the reductions in the ﬂows in and out of the mass h ( n ) relative to a frictionless
world in which all ﬁrms adjust every period. 23 Note that these ﬂows essentially are unchanged for the set of ﬁrms that
receive an idiosyncratic shock. What is different is that there exists a mass of ﬁrms that receive no idiosyncratic shock, but
may adjust to aggregate shocks. 
In their model of menu costs, Gertler and Leahy (2008) show that almost none of the latter ﬁrms in fact adjusts in the
presence of plausibly small aggregate disturbances. The same is true of our model. To understand why, it is helpful ﬁrst
to imagine the model in the absence of aggregate shocks. In that case, a ﬁrm that receives no idiosyncratic shock has no
reason to adjust: If their current productivity x = x −1 lies outside of the inaction region [ L ( n −1 ) , U ( n −1 ) ] , then it must also
have done in the past, and the ﬁrm already will have adjusted. All that changes in the presence of aggregate shocks is that
the current period’s adjustment triggers may differ from the previous period’s, inducing some ﬁrms on the margin to adjust.
When aggregate shocks are small relative to the inaction region, the latter measure of ﬁrms will be small. 24 
It follows that the reduction in the outﬂow from n relative to the frictionless case is approximated by
h −1 ( n ) { ( 1 − λ) ( G [ U ( n ) ] − G [ L ( n ) ] ) + λ} : Of the 1 − λ ﬁrms that receive an idiosyncratic shock, a fraction G [ U ( n ) ] − G [ L ( n ) ]
will not adjust away from n ; and a share λ receives no idiosyncratic shock and also does not adjust. Similarly, the reduction
in the inﬂow into n is approximated by h ∗( n ) 
{
( 1 − λ) 
(
H −1 
[
L −1 X ( n ) 
]
− H −1 
[
U −1 X ( n ) 
])
+ λ
}
. 
Comparison of the latter with the analysis of the continuous-shock case in Section 4 reveals the mechanism at the heart
of the persistence induced by the Poisson model. As in Section 4 , the reductions in the ﬂows associated with ﬁrms that
receive idiosyncratic shocks approximately cancel in the presence of a small ﬁxed adjustment cost. What remain are the
terms associated with ﬁrms that have not received an innovation to x . Crucially, these ﬂows do not cancel. As a result, the
implied approximate aggregate dynamics are 25 
h ( n ) ≈ −( 1 − λ) [ h −1 ( n ) − h ∗( n ) ] . (26) 
What emerges, then, is that aggregate dynamics in the presence of Poisson shocks are approximated by a pure partial-
adjustment process, with convergence rate equal to the probability of receiving an idiosyncratic shock, 1 − λ. Equivalently,21 These estimates are taken from Klenow and Malin’s Table 7. The lower end of this range (7 months) is found by comparing “like” prices. This approach 
retains observations on sales-related price changes only if the current sale price differs from the most recent sale price; sale and non-sale prices are never 
compared. Mean (median) duration rises to 8 (6.9) months if all sales-related price changes are dropped. 
22 Our analysis abstracts from other dimensions of Midrigan (2011) model, in particular the presence of multi-product ﬁrms and associated economies of 
scope in price adjustment. Midrigan shows that the latter also contribute to non-neutralities. 
23 A subtle but important point is that, even though ﬁrms receive idiosyncratic shocks with probability 1 − λ < 1 , they still adjust every period in a 
frictionless world due to the presence of aggregate shocks. 
24 By the same token, among ﬁrms with x = x −1 , a discrete mass will have adjusted in the past and will inherit an employment level of n −1 = X −1 ( x −1 ) . It 
follows that aggregate shocks that shift the reset function X ( · ) enough to induce even these ﬁrms to adjust in the current period will induce a discretely- 
large fraction of ﬁrms to adjust. Thus, large aggregate shocks will be more likely to induce neutrality in the presence of Poisson shocks. Karadi and 
Reiff (2012) investigate this possibility in more detail. 
25 Recall that the frictionless law of motion is h ( n ) = −[ h −1 ( n ) − h ∗( n ) ] . We have shown that the outﬂows from n are depressed relative to the 
frictionless case by λh −1 ( n ) and the inﬂows to n are depressed by λh ∗( n ). Thus, we can amend the frictionless law of motion to obtain h ( n ) ≈
−[ h −1 ( n ) − h ∗( n ) ] + λh −1 ( n ) − λh ∗( n ) , which yields the expression in the main text. 
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 the model will behave like a partial adjustment model in which the exogenous probability of adjusting is set to 1 − λ. Since
the latter is independent of the level of employment n (in contrast to the continuous-shock case studied above), it follows
that aggregate employment will inherit precisely the same partial-adjustment dynamics. Hence, we expect persistent, hump-
shaped impulse responses. 
To illustrate this point, we calibrate the model with Poisson idiosyncratic shocks and compute the impulse response
of aggregate employment to an aggregate productivity innovation. To maximize similarity with the benchmark model, we
leave virtually all of the structural parameters unchanged, and modify the adjustment cost to guarantee that it remains
equal to 8% of revenue on average. Since any λ> 0 necessarily lowers the probability of adjusting ceteris paribus , however,
this calibration will not match the baseline inaction rates. Instead, we compare the Poisson case with a calibration of the
benchmark model that implies a comparably small adjustment probability. We ﬁnd that λ = 0 . 45 induces a probability of
adjusting in the Poisson model that is similar to that in the low- σ x parameterization of the benchmark model depicted in
Fig. 4 B. 
Fig. 5 illustrates the results. Consistent with the results of Gertler and Leahy (2008) and Midrigan (2011) , one can clearly
discern much more persistent aggregate dynamics in this case, with employment converging to its frictionless counterpart
after ﬁve quarters. Moreover, the persistence cannot be attributed to a lower average adjustment rate—the low- σ x case in
Fig. 4 B induces a similar adjustment rate but exhibits much less propagation. 
Rather, the persistence is closely linked to the above intuition for the approximate partial-adjustment nature of the
model’s dynamics in the presence of Poisson shocks. To emphasize this point, Fig. 5 also plots the path of aggregate em-
ployment directly from the approximate pure partial-adjustment result in (26) as a point of comparison with the model-
generated path. Remarkably, the two paths are almost indistinguishable, suggesting that the approximate analysis above
indeed provides a very good guide to the behavior of the model. 
The source of this result can be traced to a violation of the symmetry noted in Section 4 . There we highlighted the
dual, symmetric roles of the distributions of inherited and desired employment, h −1 ( n ) and h ∗( n ), in delivering aggregate
neutrality in the presence of continuous shocks. For instance, while it seems clear that h −1 ( n ) is indicative of the mass of
ﬁrms that is deterred from adjusting away from n , a more subtle point is that it also contributes to the size of the reduction
in the probability of adjusting to n . The reason is that ﬁrms whose initial employment is near n (mass in the neighborhood
of h −1 ( n ) ) do not ﬁnd it optimal to adjust to that position. Hence, what underlies this latter, symmetric effect is the fact
is that a ﬁrm’s propensity to adjust (to n ) depends on its initial size. The model with Poisson shocks breaks this symmetry
because the arrival of new idiosyncratic shocks is independent of the ﬁrm’s state. As a result, a fraction of ﬁrms does not
adjust regardless of their initial employment, a feature reminiscent of the partial adjustment model. 
6. Summary and discussion 
Our analysis of a canonical model of ﬁxed employment adjustment costs has established a stark neutrality result. In gen-
eral, the dynamics of aggregate employment in the presence of an adjustment friction can be inferred simply and intuitively
by characterizing the evolution of the distribution of employment across ﬁrms. We show that aggregate employment dy-
namics approximately coincide with their frictionless counterpart, even in the absence of equilibrium adjustment of market
prices. This result arises from a form of symmetry in the dynamics of the ﬁrm-size distribution that emerges as the adjust-
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 ment cost becomes small. In that neighborhood, we show that the reduction in the ﬂow of ﬁrms that adjusts to a given
employment level is approximately offset by the reduction in the ﬂow of ﬁrms that adjusts away from that level, leaving
the path of the ﬁrm-size distribution almost unimpaired. 
Thus, our analysis provides an analytical foundation to recent quantitative research on the macroeconomic effects of
discrete adjustment costs in a general framework. It provides a precise formal justiﬁcation for the approximate neutrality
noted in numerical simulations by Golosov and Lucas (2007) in the context of a related menu cost model. Similarly, our
own quantitative analysis of a model of employment adjustment calibrated to leading estimates of adjustment costs imply
aggregate dynamics that are close to frictionless outcomes, also in line with our approximate neutrality result. 
Our analysis also offers a novel perspective on the circumstances in which aggregate dynamics can be expected to de-
viate from their frictionless counterparts. A unifying theme in our ﬁndings is the important role of symmetry in unwinding
the aggregate effects of lumpy adjustment. It follows that deviations from frictionless dynamics can be traced to violations
of this symmetry. We show that an important example of the latter is recent research that has invoked compound Poisson
processes of idiosyncratic shocks in which only a fraction 1 − λ of ﬁrms receives a shock each period ( Gertler and Leahy,
2008; Midrigan, 2011 ). Our approximations provide a novel perspective on this result: we demonstrate that implied ag-
gregate dynamics in this case are approximately isomorphic to partial adjustment with exogenous adjustment parameter
1 − λ. 
These results highlight a number of interesting avenues for future research. First, since the magnitude of adjustment costs
and idiosyncratic risk play a role in the model’s aggregate dynamics, it remains important for empirical work to focus on
obtaining robust estimates of these two critical parameters. Second, we join the inﬂuential recent work of Gertler and Leahy
and Midrigan in emphasizing the role of the form of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Given its theoretical importance,
future empirical work that estimates the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks will be of particular value. 
To the extent that estimates of these parameters line up with the approximate aggregate neutrality we identify, it is
worthwhile to consider other adjustment frictions that simultaneously can account for lumpy microeconomic adjustment 
and persistent aggregate dynamics. For instance, both ﬁxed and kinked (proportional) adjustment costs induce inaction at
the microeconomic level, but may have very different implications for aggregate employment dynamics. In addition, there
may be additional frictions, or technological constraints, to which the ﬁrm is subject that interact with adjustment costs.
For instance, Bachmann et al. (2013) consider a model in which there are “core components ” to the capital stock whose
depreciation must be replaced in order for the plant to operate. They argue that this feature can amplify the effects of a
ﬁxed cost of capital adjustment on the aggregate dynamics of investment. 
Our framework would suggest that, to the extent these other frictions alter the dynamics, they must disrupt the
symmetry of the adjustment policy. And indeed, using plant-level data on employment and investment, the analysis of
Caballero et al. (1995, 1997) does suggest that asymmetries are important empirically. The question of what lies behind this 
asymmetry—and what it implies for the aggregate dynamics—is thus an important topic for future research. 
Supplementary material 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.07.
008 . 
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